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The Control Theory of Perpetration in International
Criminal Law
Neha Jain*

Abstract
International criminal law lacks a coherent theory of perpetration for international
crimes. Courts and commentators oscillate between the doctrines ofJoint CriminalEnterprise
(JCE) on the one hand and co-perpetrationand indirectperpetration on the other, as modes of
responsibility. While JCE, which has close analogues in common law modes of responsibility,
has been subjected to rigorous scrutiny, co-perpetration and indirectperpetration, which are
based on established modes of responsibility in German criminallaw and doctrine, have proved
more elusive. In this Article, I lay the foundationsfor an informed discussion on theories of
responsibility in internationalcriminal law by familiariZing the audience of internationaland
comparative criminallanyers with doctrines ofperpetration in German criminallaw and their
adoption by internationalcriminal tribunals. I also take the first steps in this debate by
anayzing and ultimatey rejecting recent criticisms that have been leveled against the adoption of
co-perpetration and indirectperpetration at the internationallevel. While I remain committed
to the view that an uncriticaland wholesale transfer of these domestic modes of responsibility to
the internationalcourts would be deepy problematic, I highlight their importance to the project
of building conceptually sound andpracticaly useful doctrines of responsibilityfor international
crimes.

Law Research Fellow, Georgetown University Law Center. I wish to thank the organizers of
Osgoode Hall Law School's Conference on Rethinking Criminal Law Theory, in particular
Frangois Tanguay-Renaud and James Stribopoulos, for inviting me to respond to an excerpt from
Jens David Ohlin's paper on Joint Intentions to Commit International Crimes, and the
conference participants for their comments and suggestions. None of them is complicit in any
errors that may appear in this paper.
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1. INTRODUCTION
Constructing principles for the ascription of criminal responsibility is a task
fraught with perils. The question of who can or should be held responsible for
what, when, and in what capacity, has occupied many criminal lawyers, who have
journeyed far afield into the realms of philosophy, political science, and ethics,
to seek solutions to problems that appear only more intractable as one delves
deeper into them. Even the ostensibly simple cases provide no easy answers. X
who stabs his father must surely be guilty of patricide. What if he did so only to
prevent Y from killing both his parents instead? Where does the crux of criminal
responsibilitype? Do actions speak the loudest of all, or do our reasons for
acting the way we do supersede them? What, moreover, does our concept of
responsibility have to say about our relationship to the community in which we
live? If A selis a knife to a member of a notorious criminal gang with the
awareness that he may use it to stab his next victim, but without in any way
intending to support the criminal activity, can he legitimately shelter behind the
prescription that no man is his brother's keeper? How do we distinguish
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between persons who play different roles, ranging from the peripheral to the
essential, in the commission of a crime? R, a minor government official, tortures
V in order to obtain information, on the direct orders of S, the head of the
governmental department, and in accordance with the advice concerning the
permissibility of the act of torture prepared by the lawyer Q advising the
department. Who should be held responsible and to what extent? Should R bear
the primary responsibility as a perpetrator for having physically carried out the
act of torture, or is he simply guilty as an aider for having facilitated the act of
torture intended and planned by S, the mastermind and true perpetrator? Should
Q even fall within the net of criminality, given that he can claim to have simply
performed his professional duties?
Challenging as these issues may be in the context of a domestic crime, even
more traps await the unsuspecting lawyer once he moves to the arena of
international crimes, which are often collective in nature. An international crime
such as genocide typically involves widespread participation by a very large
number of people dispersed over time and place,' playing different roles, 2 and
acting on different motivations.3 The hypothetical figure of the lone ginocidaire
hardly ever exists in practice: the perpetrator is part of and acts within a social
structure that influences his conduct, and he acts with the consciousness that he
is part of a common project.4 To make matters more complicated, international
criminal tribunals are rarely concerned with the criminal responsibility of the
rank-and-file perpetrator of the crime. They instead focus on persons in
positions of authority5 who are often quite far removed from the actual
I

2

For instance, it is estimated that more than a million people participated in some capacity in the
Rwandan genocide, which was characterized by broad-based involvement and support. See Alison
Des Forges, 'Leave None to Tell the Stog": Genodde in Rwanda 485, 770 (Human Rights Watch 1999);
Philip Gourevitch, We Wish to Inform You That Tomorrow We Will Be Killed with Our Families:Stories
from Rwanda 244, 279 (Picador 1998).
See Michael Mann, The Dark Side of Democray 9 (Cambridge 2005); Immi Tallgren, The Sense and
Sensibifily of InternationalCriminalLaw, 13 Eur J Intl L 561, 572 (2002); Mark Osiel, Making Sense of
Mas Atrody 67 (Cambridge 2009).

3

Mann even classifies perpetrators according to their motives: ideological killers, bigoted killers,
fearful killers, careerist killers, materialist killers, disciplined killers, comradely killers, and
bureaucratic killers. Mann, Dark Side at 27-29 (cited in note 2).

4

Robert D. Sloane, The Expressive Capadly of InternationalPunishment: The Limits of the NationalLaw
Analogy and the PotentialofInternationalCriminalLaw, 43 Stan J Intl L 39, 56-58 (2007).

5

The focus on these categories of persons is a natural (though hardly inevitable) consequence of
the jurisdiction of most international tribunals being limited to senior leaders and those deemed
"most responsible" for the crimes in question. See, for example, Law on the Establishment of the
Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia for the Prosecution of Crimes Committed
During the Period of Democratic Kampuchea (2001), Art 1, amended by NS/RKM/1004/006
(Oct 27, 2004) (limiting the Court's jurisdiction to senior leaders of Democratic Kampuchea and
those most responsible for the atrocities committed during the Khmer Rouge); Statute of the
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commission of the crime, but whose role in bringing. it about is sometimes
greater than that of the physical perpetrator. 6
International criminal tribunals and academics have devoted considerable
energy to confronting these predicaments: how does one hold an individual
responsible as a perpetrator for conduct that is part of a collective criminal
project, and further, can he justifiably be labeled as a perpetrator when he
personally does not carry out any part of the actus reus of the international
crime? The jurisprudence oscillates between the doctrines of Joint Criminal
Enterprise (JCE) on the one hand and co-perpetration and indirect perpetration
on the other, as modes of attribution of responsibility for international crimes.
JCE is largely a common law influenced doctrine, with close analogues in the
doctrine of joint enterprise in English law' and the Pinkerton conspiracy doctrine
in US law.' It has been in vogue for much of the existence of the ad hoc criminal
tribunals, especially the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former
Yugoslavia (ICTY) and the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR).'
Co-perpetration and indirect perpetration are based on established modes of
responsibility in German criminal law and are currently the favored doctrines at
the International Criminal Court (ICC).'0
Whether as a result of its accessibility to common law lawyers, or because
of its more established presence in tribunal jurisprudence, almost no aspect of
JCE has been left unanalyzed." Co-perpetration and indirect perpetration have

6

Special Court for Sierra Leone, Art 1, SC Res 1315, 2178 UNTS 137, 138, 145 (Jan 16, 2002)
(similarly limiting the competence of the Court to try those bearing the greatest responsibility for
serious violations of international humanitarian law and Sierra Leonean law).
See The Attorney Generaloflsraelv Eicbmann, 36 ILR 5 197 (Dist Ct Jerusalem 1961).

7

For a succinct account of the doctrine of joint enterprise in English law, see A.P. Simester, The
Mental Element in Comphdly, 122 L Qu Rev 578 (2006); A.P. Simester, et al, Simester and Sullivan's
Criminal Law: Theoy and Doctrine 233-44 (Hart 4th ed 2010); Andrew Ashworth, Princales of
CriminalLaw 420-27 (Oxford 5th ed 2009).

8
9

See Pinkerton v United States, 328 US 640 (1946).

10

For an excellent analysis of the prominence ofJCE at the ad hoc tribunals, see generally Gideon
Boas, James Bischoff, and Natalie Reid, InternationalCriminalLaw PratitionerLibrary Vol I: Forms of
Responsibility in InternationalCriminalLaw 8-141 (Cambridge 2007).
On the recent ascendance of the doctrines at the ICC and their background in German criminal
law, see generally Florian Jessberger and Julia Geneuss, On the Application of a Theof of Indirect
Perpetrationin Al Bashir German Doctrine at the Hague?, 6 J Intl Crim Just 853 (2008); Harmen G. van
der Wilt, The ContinuousQuestfor ProperModes of CriminalResponsibi#y, 7 J Intl Crim Just 307 (2009).

11

For a sample of the vast literature on JCE, see Nicola Piacente, Importance of the Joint Criminal
EnterpriseDoctrinefor the ICTY ProsecutorialPoy,2 J Intl Crim Just 446 (2004); Allison Danner and
Jenny Martinez, Guilty Associations: joint Criminal Enterprise, Command Responsibity, and the
Development of International CriminalLaw, 93 Cal L Rev 75 (2005); Mohamed Badar, 'Just Convict
Everyone!'L-Joint Perpetration:From Tadid to Stakid and Back Again, 6 Intl Crim L Rev 293 (2006);
Jens David Ohlin, Three ConceptualProblems with the Doctrine ofJoint CriminalEnterprise, 5 J Intl Crim
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proved more elusive. English-language literature on both doctrines is limited:
most commentators on the doctrines, mainly academics trained in the civil law
tradition, only provide the gist of the doctrines or allude to specific aspects,
without examining the theories and the controversies surrounding them in any
detail.12 The elucidation of the doctrines in the jurisprudence of the tribunals is
also quite sparse and based on primarily German or Spanish sources.13 Not
surprisingly, academics without sufficient command of legal literature in these
languages have been compelled to understand and critique the doctrines relying
on scattered and sometimes opaque references by academics and the ICC. In
this Article, I seek to provide an account of the concepts of co-perpetration and
indirect perpetration based on the control theory in German criminal law, which
opens the possibility for an informed discussion on their promise as modes of
responsibility for international crimes in Section II. I also take the first steps in
this debate, by subjecting to scrutiny recent criticisms that have been leveled
against these concepts in Section III, and suggest ways in which they could
illuminate our understanding of perpetration responsibility for international
crimes in Section IV.
II. THE CONTROL THEORY IN GERMAN CRIMINAL LAW
A. Forms of Participation in German Criminal Law
The German Criminal Code (StGB) regulates the following categories of
participation in a crime:
Section 25: Principals
(1) Any person who commits the offence himself or through another shall
be liable as a principal.
(2) If more than one person commit the offence jointly, each shall be liable
as a principal (joint principals).
Section 26: Abetting

Just 69 (2007); Antonio Cassese, The Poper Limits of IndividualResponsibikly under the Doctrine ofJoint
Criminal Enterprise, 5 J Intl Crim Just 109 (2007); Elies van Sliedregt, joint CriminalEnterprise as a
Pathway to Convictng Indiiduals for Genocide, 5 J Intl Crim Just 184 (2007); Katrina Gustafson, The
Requirement of an 'Express Agreement"for joint Criminal Enterprise LIabity, 5 J Intl Crim Just 134
(2007); Allen O'Rourke, joint CriminalEnterprise and Brdanin:Misguided Overcorection,47 Harv Intl L

J 307 (2006).
12

See, for example, Kai Ambos, Joint CriminalEnterpriseand Command Responsibity, 5 J Intl Crim Just
159 (2007); Thomas Weigend, Intent, Mistake of Law, and Co-perpetrationin the Lubanga Decision on
Confirmation of Charges,6 J Intl Crim Just 471 (2008).

13

See the analysis in Section III discussing the application of the doctrines at the international
criminal tribunals.
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Any person who intentionally induces another to intentionally commit an
unlawful act (abettor) shall be liable to be sentenced as if he were a
principal.
Section 27: Aiding

(1) Any person who intentionally assists another in the intentional
commission of an unlawful act shall be convicted and sentenced as an aider.
(2) The sentence for the aider shall be based on the penalty for a principal.
It shall be mitigated pursuant to section 49 (1).14
Thus, a principal party to the crime commits the offense himself
(unmittelbare Tdter, or direct perpetrator), or through another person (mittelbare
Tdter, or indirect perpetrator), or jointly with another principal (Mittdter, or coperpetrator). In addition, commentators recognize the category of
Nebentdterscbaft, or independent multiple principals acting alongside each other
towards the commission of an offense.1s An accessory either intentionally
induces another person to intentionally commit an unlawful act (Anstiter or
abettor or instigator) or intentionally renders aid to another in the latter's
intentional commission of an unlawful act (Beihilfe, or aider).16
The StGB is, however, silent on the criterion for demarcation between
principals and accessories, and the Federal Court of Justice (Bundesgerichtshofor
BGH) and criminal law commentators have propounded numerous theories on
the appropriate dividing line. The first category of theories, called the "objective
theories," considers the perpetrator to be the person who realizes the elements
of an offense, either in full or in part, himself; all other contributors to the
offense are accessories.' 7 In contrast, the "subjective theories" determine the
status of a party to a crime depending on whether he possessed the will of a
perpetrator or that of an accessory, and they use different criteria to determine

14

Strafgesetzbuch [StGB] [Criminal Code] Nov 13, 1998, Budesgesetzblatt Teil I [BGBL I] 3322 as
amended by Art 3 of Law of Oct 2, 2009 BGBL I 3214. I have relied on the English translation
by Michael Bohlander authorized by the Federal Ministry of Justice, online at
http://www.gesetze-im-intemet.de/englisch-stgb/index.html (visited Feb 5, 2011).

1s

Johannes Wessels and Werner Beulke, Strafrecht, allgemeiner Teik Die Straftat und ibr Aufbau
(Scbwerpunkte) 179, 185 ss (CF Mdller Verlag 2008) (German); Michael Bohlander, Prinables of
German CriminalLaw 153 (Hart 2009).
Wessels and Beulke, Schwerpunkte at 179 (cited in note 15); Bohlander, German CriminalLaw at 153
(cited in note 15).

16

17

See Heinrich Wilhelm Laufhiitte, et al, eds, SIrafgeseqbuch Lep ger Kommentar (Grofikommentar):
Band 1 1848 (de Gruyter Recht 2006) (German); Ulrich Sieber and Marc Engelhart, Strajbare
Milwirkung von Fuhrungspersonenin StraftdtergruppenundNerwerken in Deutrchland,Max-Planck-Institut
fiir auslandisches und internationales Strafrecht *16 (Unpublished Report, 2009) (German)
(hereinafter "MPICC Repod).
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this will." The theory most widely endorsed by prominent commentators on
German criminal law is the doctrine of "act-domination" or control
(Tatherrmchaftslebre), which represents a synthesis of the objective and subjective
theories. On this account, the decisive criterion for establishing the boundary
between principals and accessories is control over the act: the perpetrator
dominates or controls the commission of the act, and the accessory participates
in its occurrence without domination. To have control over the act means to
hold in one's hands the elements constituting the offense (with the requisite
intent).19 This control can take different forms: direct domination over the act in
the case of direct perpetration (Handlungsherrschafl);control over the will of the
direct perpetrator or domination arising out of the superior knowledge of the
indirect perpetrator in the case of indirect perpetration (Willensherrschaf); or
functional domination of the participating joint actor in the case of coperpetration (funktionalle Tatherrschaf).20The perpetrator is the person who, as the
key figure (Zentralgestal) in the events, exercises this control through his ability to
strategically mastermind the commission of the act (in indirect perpetration) or
through his joint hegemony over the act (in co-perpetration). He can thereby
execute or obstruct the commission of the offense according to his will. In
contrast, the accessory is the marginal figure in the course of events who merely
aids or otherwise advances the commission of the criminal act. 21
The control theory is more multifaceted and more persuasive than the
objective and subjective theories, both theoretically as well as pragmatically. It
brings together several modes of conduct (act-domination, will domination, and
functional domination) under the umbrella term of "control" and thus provides
the possibility of a more nuanced concept of perpetration. Unlike the subjective
theories, the control theory recognizes that the perpetrator is the subject of the
offense, and his conviction is tied to the unlawfulness of the elements of the
offense, rather than the blameworthiness of his internal attitude. 22 It also
transcends the narrowness of the objective theories in dispensing with the
requirement of personal fulfillment of all the elements of the offense and
acknowledging that they can be realized with the help of a coerced human
instrument or in cooperation with another person. 23

20

Sieber and Engelhart, MPICC Report at 16 (cited in note 17); Wessels and Beulke, Schwerpunkte at
182 (cited in note 15); Laufhitte, et al, eds, Leip ger Kommentar at 1846-47 (cited in note 17).
Wessels and Beulke, Schwerpunkte at 181 (cited in note 15); Sieber and Engelhart, MPICC Report at
17 (cited in note 17).
Wessels and Beulke, Schwerpunkte at 181 (cited in note 15).

21

Id at 181-82; Sieber and Engelhart, MPICCRepordat 17 (cited in note 17).

22

Laufhitte, et al, eds, IebjgerKommentar at 1860 (cited in note 17).

23

Id.

18

19
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The control theory was first systematized by Claus Roxin and is now
endorsed by the majority of commentators, though in varying forms.24
Furthermore, even though the courts continue to adhere to the subjective
theory, the current jurisprudence comes quite close to the control doctrine in its
use of objective criteria for the identification of the will of the perpetrator. 25 For
instance, in the Katqenkbnigfall (Cat King Case), 26 H and P induced R, a
psychologically dependent man, into believing that a demon called the Cat King
was the supreme power in the universe. H wanted to get rid of N and, together
with P, H convinced R that if he did not kill N as a human sacrifice, the Cat
King would instead massacre a million people. R was persuaded to act on this
belief and stabbed N three times. H, P, and R were all convicted of attempted
murder. One of the main questions considered by the court was whether H and
P should be held liable as perpetrators or only as accessories to the attempted
murder.27 The court stated that the issue of whether H and P can be classified as
indirect perpetrators will depend on their objective control measured by the
criterion of the will of the perpetrator. The indirect perpetrator is the person
who induces and manipulates the conduct he intends by deliberately causing a
mistake of law, such that the person laboring under the mistake can still be
regarded as his (culpable) tool. H and P deluded R and then consciously
manipulated him into carrying out the act of murder intended by them. They
also determined substantially the mode of its execution-for example, P handed
him the murder weapon and instructed him how to use it. R was in a dependent
relationship with H and P, which H and P used to control him, and from which
R could extricate himself only with great difficulty. Thus, H and P could induce
R to commit the crime and could control the act's execution through the
strength of their influence and their superior knowledge of the circumstances of
the case.
Commentators have employed the control theory to explain all three
categories of perpetration-direct, indirect, and co-perpetration. In the
remainder of this Section, I will concentrate on its application to the two forms
of perpetration most relevant for international crimes: co-perpetration and
Organisationsherrschaft (control over the act by virtue of a hierarchical
organization).
24
25

See, for example, Wessels and Beulke, Schwerpunkte at 182-83 (cited in note 15); Sieber and
Engelhart, MPICC Report at 17 (cited in note 17).
Laufhitte, et al, eds, Lepgger Kommentar at 1856-57 (cited in note 17).

26

Budesgerichtshof [BGH] [Federal Court of Justice] Sept 15, 1988, 35 Entscheidungen des
Bundesgerichtshof in Strafsachen [BGHSt] 347 (FRG). For a summary of the case, see Laufhiitte,
et al, eds, Leipper Kommentar at 1895-96 (cited in note 17). See also George P. Fletcher, Basic
Concepts of CriminalLaw198-99 (Oxford 1998).

2

BGH, 35 BGHSt at 351, 356 (cited in note 26).
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B. Co-Perpetration (Mittdterschaft)
Co-perpetration is the joint commission of a criminal act 28 through a
knowing and willing working together of the individual participants. 29 It is based
on the functional act-domination of each co-perpetrator, which arises from the
principle of division of labor and functional role allocation.30 This allocation
ensures that the success of the criminal act is possible only through the
cooperation of all co-perpetrators, so that the plan succeeds or fails depending
on the functional contribution of each co-perpetrator. The act-domination of
the co-perpetrator is based on the fact that through his part of the act, he
simultaneously controls the total act; his failure to perform his part of the act
also results in a failure of the entire plan for all the other participants.3 1 For
instance, two bank robbers A and B rob a bank together where A threatens the
employees with a gun while B removes the cash from the tills. Every participant
here acts as an equal partner-he participates in a common agreement or plan
and joint commission of the criminal act. The act contributions complement
each other in such a manner that they collectively make the criminal act a joint
venture, and the joint result is fully attributable to each co-worker. 32
There are mainly two requirements for co-perpetration: an objective
requirement of collective act execution for the realization of the elements of the
offense and a subjective requirement of a common act plan.33
1. Collective act execution.
The co-perpetrators must work together, based on a division of labor,
towards the attainment of the result of the elements of the offense. The act
contribution of each co-perpetrator must therefore be of sufficient weight and
importance such that it grounds the necessary co-domination over the act; this is
indeed the primary difference between co-perpetration and aiding, where the
contribution of the participant merely amounts to helping the act of another.3 4
As a general rule, the contribution must consist of an act by the perpetrator,
though the jurisprudence of the courts and part of the literature endorses co-

29

§25 (cited in note 14).
Sieber and Engelhart, MPICC Report at 29 (cited in note 17); Wessels and Beulke, Schwerpunkte at
186 (cited in note 15).

3o

Laufhitte, et al, eds, Let'jgerKommentarat 1931 (cited in note 17).

31

Id at 1931-32.

32

Sieber and Engelhart, MPICC Report at 29 (cited in note 17); Laufhiitte, et al, eds, Lepgger
Kommentar at 1931-32 (cited in note 17).

33

Sieber and Engelhart, MPICC Report at 29 (cited in note 17).

34

Id at 30.

28

See StGB
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perpetration through omissions.35 Thus, if A and B, two prison officers, agree to
make the escape of a prisoner possible such that A hands the prisoner the key
(act) while B leaves the outer prison gates unlocked in violation of his duty
(omission), they will still be co-perpetrators of the offense of facilitating the
escape of prisoners (StGB 5 120).36 If the conditions for co-perpetration are
present, the objective act contributions of the participants are mutually
attributed as if they had realized all the elements themselves. An attribution is,
however, not possible when the elements of the offense have special
requirements for the perpetrator such that they call for personal commission by
the perpetrator. Also, it is not possible to attribute subjective characteristics such
as special intent requirements to another person.37
There is a good deal of controversy over whether this act contribution
must be at the stage of execution of the elements of the offense, or whether
contributions in the preparation stage may also be sufficient. According to the
established jurisprudence of the BGH, even a small amount of cooperation in
the preparation stage may lead to liability as a co-perpetrator if it is carried out
with the will of a perpetrator 38 (an idea that reflects the continuing influence of
the subjective theory in the BGH's jurisprudence39). This includes acts such as
ferrying the perpetrator to the scene of the crime, participating in the planning
of a murder, and even giving advice to the co-perpetrator that strengthens his
resolve to commit the crime. 0 Commentators disagree on whether such
preparatory acts can ground co-perpetration. The typical example given is that of
a gang leader who conceives of the criminal scheme and decides on its mode of
commission, but leaves its execution entirely to the other gang members.41 One
strand of opinion would reject liability of the gang leader as a co-perpetrator and
hold him responsible only as an accessory, unless he took part in some manner
in the execution of the crime-for instance, if he remained in contact with the
gang through telephone or radio and thus conducted their deployment.42 Others
contest this characterization on the basis that the gang leader is not participating

35

Id at 29.

36

Laufhutte, et al, eds, Lxi

37

Sieber and Engelhart, MPICC Report at 32 (cited in note 17); Wessels and Beulke, Schwerpunkte at
188 (cited in note 15).
Laufhtitte, et al, eds, Leipzger Kommentar at 1942 (cited in note 17) and cases cited therein.

38

ger Kommentar at 1935 (cited in note 17).

39

See Section IIA, for the discussion of the Cat King Case on the BGH and its adherence to the
subjective theory for demarcating parties to a crime.

4o

Laufhiitte, et al, eds, Leipzger Kommentar at 1942 (cited in note 17).
Wessels and Beulke, Scbwerpunkte at 187 (cited in note 15); Claus Roxin, Tdterschaft and Tatherrwchaft
298-300 (de Gruyter Recht 2006).
Roxin, Tdterscbaft and Tatherrschaftat 298-300 (cited in note 41).

41
42
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in the act of another, but rather the result of the act is consequent to a willing,
collective participation in a joint act. Also, given the role of the gang leader, it
would be inappropriate to consider him an accessory-a marginal figure in the
course of events. 43
There is, however, merit in the argument that since perpetration is tied to
the realization of the elements of the offense, co-perpetration must consist of
joint domination of the implementation of these elements, and thus must exist
during the execution stage. A person who merely participates in the preparation
stage can certainly influence the course of events but can scarcely be said to
control it. If the executor of the plan acts freely and with responsibility, the
realization of the plan would always be dependent on the initiative, resolutions,
and decisions of the direct executor.44 Thus, only cooperation in the execution
stage would justify responsibility as a co-perpetrator. This execution stage,
however, is not limited to the core elements of the offense, but rather
encompasses the entire phase between the beginning of the attempt and the
formal completion of the act and covers actions that would form an inseparable
part of the complex action chain.45
Another situation which represents an ambiguity in the objective
requirements for co-perpetration is the scenario of "successive coperpetration." 46 Here the question is whether a contribution subsequent to the
commencement of the execution stage can also be punished as co-perpetration,
such as when a person joins an action of resistance that has already begun and
takes part in further attacks against the enforcement agency. The jurisprudence
affirms co-perpetration during the entire execution stage as long as the
subsequent participation is based on a mutual understanding and is not unilateral
in nature. 47 There is controversy over whether aggravating factors that were
already completed before the participation of the subsequently joining coperpetrator can also be attributed to him. While the courts favor this attribution,
the majority of the literature rejects it on the basis that this undermines the
functional act-domination at the heart of co-perpetration.48
2. Common act plan.
As functional act-domination based on cooperation in accordance with a
division of labor presupposes an overall plan, co-perpetration requires that the
43

Wessels and Beulke, Schwerpunkte at 190 (cited in note 15).

44

Laufhiitte, et al, eds, LOI ger Kommentarat 1943 (cited in note 17).

45

Id at 1943-44.

46

Id at 1950.

47

Id.

48

Laufhiitte, et al, eds, Leo ger Kommentar at 1951-53 (cited in note 17).
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contributors to the criminal act reach an agreement to commit the act as equal
partners. 49 Mutual consent is essential for the joint realization of the act at the
time of, or even before the beginning of, the act. A jointly developed and
decided-upon plan is not essential. The acceptance or approval of an already
formed plan of another which then forms the basis of the further joint action, is
sufficient. This agreement may not take place explicitly; it can also take place by
implication. This would exclude situations where a joint accord is missing, such
as a coincidental simultaneous exploitation of a situation by persons working
side-by-side without a mutual understanding. 50 Co-perpetration is also possible if
the individual participants do not know each other, as long as each person is
conscious that there are other participants who are likewise working towards a
common goal and that those other participants have the same knowledge.51
From the necessity for a common act plan it follows that the act of one of
the contributors that goes beyond the plan, the so-called "excess," cannot be
attributed to the others. 52 This is because the other contributors do not have
hegemony over the act or the requisite intention regarding the deviation.53 Thus,
if several persons plan a robbery and one of them gets carried away and commits
a murder during the robbery, he alone will be responsible for the killing.54 There
are some exceptions to this rule, as it is not necessary that the common plan
covers each and every detail of the execution; each perpetrator may be given
some leeway to act as the situation demands as long as this helps accomplish the
common goal. Therefore, deviations from the common plan that are within the
range of the relevant acts with which one must normally reckon do not count as
an excess. The main test is the foreseeability of the deviant course of action.55 A
deviation from the original plan during the joint executing action can also be
introduced into the agreement by a mutual understanding, which again negates
excess.56

49

Sieber and Engelhart, MPICC Report at 31 (cited in note 17); Laufhiitte, et al, eds, Leip! ger
Kommentar at 1938 (cited in note 17).
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Sieber and Engelhart, MPICC Report at 31 (cited in note 17); Laufhitte, et al, eds, LIp ger
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C. Organisationsherrschaft
Section 25 of the StGB states that a person who perpetrates or commits a
crime through another is an indirect perpetrator.s7 The word "through" signifies
that the indirect perpetrator (Hintermann) controls the direct perpetrator
(Frontmann)of the criminal act in such a manner that he uses or manipulates him
as a human tool or instrument. Due to this "tool" function, the Frontmann
normally possesses some deficit (for instance, he lacks the requisite intent for the
offense), which the Hintermann exploits in order to control or dominate him.58
Thus, while the Frontmann still possesses act hegemony (Handlungsherrscbaf),this
is overlaid by the Willensherrschaft, or domination over the will, of the Frontmann
by the Hintermann.5 Two main groups of indirect perpetration are recognized.
The first is the normal case of indirect perpetration where the hegemony of the
Hintermannis based on his dominance over the Frontmann due to some factual or
legal grounds. This results in the latter's exemption from criminal responsibility.
The second group is the exception where the Frontmann is held liable alongside
the Hintermann despite the latter's hegemony. The Hintermann is, in this case, the
"perpetrator behind the perpetrator." 60 The most frequently cited cases of
establishing control leading to indirect perpetration are coercion; utilization of a
mistake on the part of the Frontmann or on the basis of the Hintermann's superior
knowledge; and hegemony through control over an organizational apparatus, or
Organisationsherrschaft.61
Organisationsherrmchaftrefers to the category of cases where the Hintermann
has an organized power apparatus at his disposal through which he can
accomplish the offenses at which he aims, without having to leave their
realization contingent on an independent decision by the Frontmann. Unlike the
other two forms of domination by will, Organisationsherrschafttransfers control
over the course of events to the Hintermann despite a fully criminally responsible
intermediary.62 The special position of the Hintermannin these cases results from
the specific mode of action within the framework of the organizational
apparatus. Such an organization develops a life that is independent of the
changing existence of its members and of the decisions of the individual act
executors; it functions as if it were automatic. Figuratively speaking, the

s7
58
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StGB § 25 (cited in note 14).
Sieber and Engelhart, MPICC Report at 19 (cited in note 17); Wessels and Beulke, Schwerpunkte at
190 (cited in note 15).
Roxin, Tdertchaft und Tathermchaft at 143 (cited in note 41).
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Sieber and Engelhart, MPICC Report at 20 (cited in note 17).
Roxin, Tdterschaft und Tathermchaft at 242 (cited in note 41).
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Hintermann sits at the operational center of the organizational structure and, if he
presses a button to order a killing, he can expect it to be fulfilled without his
even knowing who executes the action. 63 This expectation of fulfillment does
not arise from any deception or duress on the part of the Hintermann.Instead, it
is based on the fungibility of the executing organs, such that if one organ refuses
to participate, another immediately steps into its place and the execution of the
total plan continues unhindered. Each executing organ is therefore an
anonymous and arbitrarily exchangeable figure, much like a simple cog in a
machine-like organization, which places the Hintermann in the central position of
the occurrence and lends him domination over the act."6
It is irrelevant for Organisationsherrscbaftwhether the Hintermann acts on his
own initiative or on the instructions of more highly-placed superiors. All that is
required is that he can direct or steer the part of the organization that is
subordinate to him, without having to rely on the resolution of his subordinates
for the commission of the offense.65 An action that does not independently
work to steer the organization further would only qualify as accessorial in nature.
For instance, A, who simply outlines the plan of destruction without possessing
any authority, and B, who stands outside the apparatus as an informer, can only
be accessories because they lack steering power. This does not imply that their
conduct is less despicable than that of the perpetrator, but it is the element of
control, not the degree of culpability, that is decisive for the demarcation of the
forms of perpetration. 66
1. The BGH's adoption of Organisationsherrschaft.
The BGH first adopted the doctrine of Organisationsherrschaftin its decision
of the German border guards' case in 1994. The BGH, however, did not rely
solely on Roxin's version of Oranisaionsherrschaftin its formulation; it combined
it with Schroeder's criterion of the intermediary's [absolute] readiness to realize
the criminal act. It held that a Hintermann has domination over an act, despite a
fully responsible Frontmann, if he uses the basic framework conditions of an
organizational structure within which his act contribution gives rise to a regular
63

Claus Roxin, Straftaten im Rahmen organisatorircherMachtapparate, 110 Goltdammer's Archiv fur
Strafrecht 193, 200 (1963); Roxin, Tdterscbaft and Tatherrrchaft at 245 (cited in note 41).
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operational sequence. Such framework conditions may exist in command
hierarchies as well as in state, business, or business-like organizational structures.
If the Hintermann acts in the knowledge of these circumstances, in particular if he
uses the absolute readiness of the executing organ to fulfill the elements of the
offense, and if he wants his action to culminate in the result of the element of
the offense, then he will be the indirect perpetrator. 68
The BGH, however, went beyond Roxin in introducing the possibility of
using Oganisaionsherrschaft in the case of economic and business-like
enterprises. 69 Roxin limits the application of his theory to those organizations
that are completely detached from the legal order. As long as the administration
and execution organs keep themselves bound in principle to an independent
legal order, the instructions to commit criminal acts cannot ground actdomination. The laws of this order will have a higher ranking vis-i-vis the illegal
instructions and will thus exclude the domination by will of the Hintermann.70
Roxin mainly confined Oqanisadonsherrschaftto two cases: crimes committed by
the state authorities and crimes committed by organizations such as
underground movements, secret organizations, criminal organizations, and
similar unions that function as a "state within the state."71
In later decisions, the BGH has expanded the range of application of the
doctrine even further to include organizations such as hospitals. It also uses
different criteria for holding the Hintermann responsible, including his conscious

creation and use of the basic framework conditions of the organizational
structure in order to implement the elements of the offense.72 There is no
mention of the element of fungibility, which is fundamental to Roxin's
explication.73 To assess the merit of these different approaches, it is important to
consider each of the criteria for Oganisaionsherrschaftthat Roxin put forward.
2. Elements of Organisaionsherrschaft.
There are three main elements in Roxin's theory of Organisaionshewschaft(1) the existence of a hierarchical vertically-structured organization (power
68

Id.

69

On this extension of Organisationshecrsbaft,see Sieber and Engelhart, MPICCReport at 23-24 (cited
in note 17).
Roxin, 110 Goltdammer's Archiv fir Strafrecht at 204 (cited in note 63); Roxin, Tdterschaft und
Tatberschaftat 249 (cited in note 41).
Roxin, 110 Goltdammer's Archiv fir Strafrecht at 205 (cited in note 63); Roxin, Tdterschaft and
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Tatherrschaftat 250 (cited in note 41).
Compare BGHSt 48, 77 (90 f) and BGHSt 48, 331 (342) with Bundesgerichtshof [BGH] [Federal
Court of Justice] (July 3, 2003) 1 StR C453/02, 30 f (FRG). Sieber and Engelhart, MPICC Report
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Thomas Rotsch, Neues .ur Organisationsberrschaft,Neue Zeitschrift fur Strafrecht 13, 17 (2005).
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apparatus), (2) the unlimited exchangeability of the direct actor within the power
apparatus (fungibility); and (3) the working of the apparatus outside of the legal
order (detachedness from the law). 74
a) Taut hierarchicaloqaniZationalstructure.
Roxin's elucidation of Oqanisationsherrschaft requires an organizational
structure which functions such that the instructions of the Hintermann lead to an
automatic implementation of the elements of the offense. Roxin also discusses
an organization that is independent of its individual members, where the
members act as a functional part of a larger machine-like structure; this is the
basis on which he excludes a group of asocial persons who unite to commit
common criminal offenses and elect one of them as their leader.7 This concept
presupposes a fairly tightly organized hierarchical structure.76
Roxin ties this structure to the existence of a large number of fungible act
intermediaries. However, it is difficult to reconcile these two elements in
practice. The larger the number of act intermediaries, the more difficult it would
be to control the system so that the Hintermann's instructions can be
implemented smoothly.77 This is even more so if these intermediaries are
arbitrarily replaceable. One could interpret Roxin as referring to a functionally
differentiated and decentralized large enterprise, where the actors often do not
know of each other's exact functions and perform their tasks more or less
independently. It is, however, more difficult to ensure a "regular operational
sequence" within such a structure, 8 and the ability to replace arbitrarily the
intermediaries also becomes far more limited in such circumstances.
b) Fungibility of the act intermediaries.
For Roxin, fungibility of the act intermediaries forms a central part of his
theory of Organisationsherrschaft,for it is only due to a large number of replaceable
act executors that the refusal of any one of them to commit a criminal act

74

Henning Radtke, Mittelbare Tdterschaft kraft Organisaionsherrschaftim naionalen and internaionalen
Strafecht, 153 Goltdammer's Archiv ftir Strafrecht 350, 354 (2006) (German).
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Kai Ambos, Tatberrscbaft durcb Willensherrschaft krafi organisatorischer Machtapparate, 145
Goltdammer's Archiv fir Strafrecht 226, 240-41 (1998) (German).
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cannot adversely affect the execution of the criminal plan." This criterion has
been heavily disputed by commentators.
One set of arguments focuses on the view of act intermediaries as
instrumental cogs in a machine. It asserts that the expectation of automatic
implementation of the elements of the offense by these intermediaries
contradicts holding them criminally responsible as direct perpetrators.8 Even in
the strictest.and most tightly controlled organizational structure, the assumption
of soulless humans is also contested, and the fundamental unpredictability of
freely acting humans (Organisaionsherschaftassumes this freedom) cannot be
eliminated. Organisationsherrschaftpresents us with a crooked picture of humans
who are merged into an organizational structure and become one with the
machine. However, just because some or all of the individuals are replaceable
does not make the enterprise any less a union of human beings, nor does it
lessen the imponderability of the result that follows from this basis. If the
picture of the soulless power apparatus is taken seriously, it is hard to see why
this does not at the same time justify relieving the act executors from criminal
responsibility. 81

These internal contradictions of a criminally responsible yet machine-like
direct executor can be partially resolved if one distinguishes more clearly
between individual unlawfulness and collective unlawfulness (that is,
unlawfulness that arises in organizational settings). 82 Unlike the typical case of
indirect perpetration where the responsibility of the Hintermann is based on his
direct control over the direct perpetrator, in cases of macro-criminality, the
Hintermann controls the intermediary only indirectly through the mechanism of
the organizational apparatus.83 The direct perpetrator is, on the one hand,
responsible for his own criminal acts; on the other hand, his actions are part of
the acts of the organization as a whole. This organizational aspect does not
relieve him as an individual for the individual unlawfulness. However, the only
person who can be held responsible for this organizational unlawfulness is the
person who has control over the organization-the Hintermann.8 4
This objection is connected to the second set of arguments against
fungibility: in the context of the concrete act, there are usually only a limited

82
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269,
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Ambos, 145 Goltdammer's Archiv fir Strafrecht at 234 (cited in note 76).

83

Id.

84

Rene Bloy, GrenZen der Tdterscbaft bei fremdhadndiger Tataufhrung, 143 Goltdammer's Archiv fiir
Strafrecht 424, 441 (1996) (German).

79
80
81

Summer 2011 -1

175

ChicagoJournalof InternationalLaw

number of act intermediaries who can commit it. One cannot therefore refer to
an unlimited number of exchangeable act executors. For instance, in the case of
the guards posted at the border between East and West Germany, in the context
of the temporally and spatially limited concrete act of preventing the escape of
refugees, only a few soldiers were present.8 5 At best, the soldiers were not
instantly but only successively replaceable. This would not differ in any material
way from any other form of indirect perpetration or guarantee automatic
implementation of the elements of the offense for the concrete individual
offense.86
Roxin seems to distinguish, though, between immediate substitutability in
the context of the concrete act and the abstract substitutability as a whole within
the structure of the power apparatus. He states that in the concrete situation, as
in the Staschinski case, only a few persons need to be involved.8 7 This, however,
separates the criterion of fungibility from the concrete act and appears to ground
domination over the concrete act on a different criterion: the conception of the
direct executor that if he were to refuse, another person would perform the
criminal act in his stead, hence leading to his implementing the elements of the
offense. This would, however, make the Hintermann's domination over the act
contingent on his awareness of the belief of the direct executor, which is
suspiciously close to a subjective rather than objective basis for act-domination.
It would also contradict Roxin's own repudiation of the subjective theory.8 8
Even leaving aside this potential inconsistency, the direct executor's mere belief
that he is exchangeable will not necessarily make him perform the criminal act.
Even if he is convinced of the inevitability of the criminal result, he may still be
revolted by the thought of being personally implicated in it and thus refrain from
participation.
Roxin's argument could perhaps still be saved if having domination or
control over the act simply has a different meaning in the context of
Organisationsherrschaftthan it does in other cases of indirect perpetration. In the
usual case of indirect perpetration, the "act" (over which the Hintermann must
have control) represents the direct criminal act committed by the Frontmann. In
Organisaionsherrschaft,the "act" may be taken to refer to the entire expiration of
events leading to the fulfillment of the result of the elements of the offense. The
Hintermann would thus have the central position if he controls the sequence of

85
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events until the implementation of the crime."9 However, this would result in a
decoupling of the domination over the act from the elements of the offense. If
Roxin were to accept this solution, it would contradict his stance that the
perpetrator must have the key position in the elements of the offense covered by
the execution action. 90
c) Detachednessfrom the legal order.
Roxin limits the operation of Organisationsherrschaftto organizations that are
detached from the legal order, for it is only in these organizations that the
administrative and executive organs of the power apparatus are not bound to
laws that have a higher ranking. This would normally exclude the automatic
implementation of the Hintermann's illegal instructions. This criterion is
challenged primarily by Ambos, who states that while detachedness from the law
may exist in these organizations, it is not a necessary condition)' In fact, if the
organization forms part of the legal order, the Hintermann's domination over the
act is greater. 92 He argues that in the case of non-State power apparatuses that
have a symbiotic relationship with the State, such as the Sicilian mafia or
Colombian drug cartels, the organization is not detached from the law, but
rather operates as a "para State,"-that is, it is integrated into the law in order to
achieve a common interest. This does not, however, change anything in the
effective domination of the top management of the apparatus over the act and
direct executors.93 Ambos is guilty of eliding the distinction between the
"government" and the "State." While there may indeed be a symbiotic
relationship between the former and the organization, one cannot equate this to
an integration of the organization within the positive legal order that may still be
committed to fighting the criminal acts of the organization.
Ambos is more careful of this distinction when discussing state-organized
power apparatuses, where he admits the existence of two parallel legal orders.94
The first is the "normal" State legal order, which is obligated to fight crime. The
second is the "perverted" legal order, based on a secret plan of the government
aimed at criminal ends, which forms the basis of the clandestinely operating
national power apparatus.95 However, the situation changes if the legal order
forms the basis of state sanctioned crime, where crimes are perpetrated in the
89
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name of the law by the authority of the executive and through the
instrumentality of the courts." Here there is no element of detachedness from
the law; instead, with the concentration of unlawfulness and the authority of the
law in the hands of the same national power apparatus, the automatic
implementation of the illegal instruction by the act intermediary is even more
assured than in a case of law detachedness.97
Ambos admits that "law" in Roxin's sense can also refer to natural rather
than positive law; the state apparatus that acts in contradiction to lex naturalis
thus detaches itself from the order of the natural law, even if it is in conformity
with the positive law.98 However, Ambos rejects this interpretation on the
ground that it is too abstract and that such unwritten supra-legal principles do
not lend themselves to clear or immediate understanding for the act
intermediary.9 9 Thus, they cannot form a normative barrier to the execution of
the Hintermann's orders.100
Ambos's criticism on law detachedness is convincing in the context of a
state apparatus if Roxin indeed takes law to mean positive law. However, Roxin
intuitively seems to have in mind natural rather than positive law. His references
to a "higher ranking" of this law,o1 and to the rarity of such an organization
existing in a constitutionally stable legal order,102 point heavily in this direction.
As we will discuss later, the criterion of law detachedness may in fact prove to
be one of the most salient features of a doctrine of responsibility for
international crimes.103
Having considered the main elements of the control theory as applied to
the concepts of co-perpetration and Organisationsherrschaft,it is now possible to
analyze its transposition to the world of international criminal law, particularly
the enthusiasm with which it has been taken up by the ICC, and recent criticisms
of the theory by international criminal law academics.
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III. CO-PERPETRATION AND INDIRECT PERPETRATION AS
MODES OF LIABILITY FOR INTERNATIONAL CRIMES
A. The Control Theory of Perpetration in Tribunal
Jurisprudence
While the doctrines of co-perpetration and indirect perpetration have
gained renewed prominence due to their adoption by the ICC, they initially
invited scrutiny in the aftermath of opinions rendered by judges of the ICTY.
The first ICTY judgment to employ the theory of co-perpetration was the Stakic
Trial Chamber, which held that before resorting to JCE, it would give preference
to "a more direct reference to 'commission"' such as co-perpetration.10 The
Chamber relied on Roxin to define the key factor as the joint control of the
perpetrators over the act such that the perpetrators can realize their plans only
insofar as they work together towards its accomplishment, whereas each can
individually ruin the plan if he fails to carry out his part.105 It set out the physical
and mental elements of co-perpetration, consisting of (1) an explicit agreement
or tacit understanding to reach (2) a common goal through (3) cooperation and
(4) joint control over the criminal conduct;10 6 (5) the accused's awareness of the
substantial likelihood that crimes would result from cooperation ensuing from
the same degree of control over the common acts; and (6) the accused's
awareness that his role is essential for the common goal's fulfillment.107
The Stakic Trial Chamber acknowledged that even though its concept of
perpetration overlapped in part with the definition of JCE, the Chamber's
conception was both closer to what most legal systems recognized as
"commission" and avoided introducing modes of liability that were not
contemplated in the ICTY Statute.o8 This conclusion is far from satisfactory.
Not only is it entirely unclear what the Chamber meant by suggesting that coperpetration is a more 'direct' mode of responsibility as compared to JCE, it also
fails to clarify the relationship between co-perpetration and JCE. Additionally,
the breadth of sources relied on by the Chamber leaves much to be desired.' 9 It
is thus not altogether surprising that the overly economical elucidation of the
doctrine in Stakic then led to the confused indictment in Milutinovic, where the

104 Prosecutorv Stakic, Case No IT-97-24-T, ICTY Trial Chamber Judgment,
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Prosecution argued that under the concept of "indirect co-perpetration" in
Stakic, an accused will be liable "if he has an agreement with others, plays a key
role in the agreement and one or more participants used others to carry out
crimes."" 0 The Miluinovic Trial Chamber rejected this mode of responsibility,
holding that the source cited by the Stakic Trial Chamber (Roxin) did not
support its definition of the physical elements and that it could not find any
evidence for these elements in customary international law."' Furthermore,
neither Roxin nor Stakic made mention of participants to the agreement using
persons outside the agreement to commit the crimes.112 Given that the
prosecution put forward an entirely different form of perpetration responsibility
than the one employed in Stakic, albeit one that is endorsed by the control
theory and by Roxin, the Milutinovic Trial Chamber rightly did not find its claim
supportable by Stakic. On the same day, the Stakic Appeals Chamber set aside
the portions of the Stakic Trial Chamber's decision dealing with co-perpetration
on the ground that this mode of liability did not have support either in
customary international law or in the settled jurisprudence of the ICTY."13
Judge Schomburg sought to remedy some of the problematic aspects of
Stakic in his separate opinion in the Gacumbitsi Appeals Judgment.114 Here, he
endorsed the core physical elements of co-perpetration as set out in Stakic. Judge
Schomburg relied not only on Roxin, but also on the penal codes of Colombia,
Paraguay, and Finland in support of these elements.115 He also put forward
indirect perpetration, or "perpetration by means," as a distinct mode of
responsibility that was well established in several legal systems around the
world.116 In order to be liable for indirect perpetration, the accused must have
used the direct or physical perpetrator of the crime as a mere instrument for the
commission of the crime. The attribution of criminal liability was based on the
control exercised by the accused over the conduct and the will of the physical
perpetrator." 7
110
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Judge Schomburg concluded with the observation that indirect
perpetration was particularly apposite as a theory of international criminal
responsibility, as it served to bridge the physical distance between the crime and
persons who should be considered the main perpetrators due to their
involvement and control over the crimes committed.118 This had also been
recognized in Article 25(3)(a) of the Rome Statute establishing the International
Criminal Court, which provided for liability through co-perpetration as well as
indirect perpetration.1 9 Judge Schomburg acknowledged that these modes of
liability overlapped to a great extent with JCE, the main difference consisting in
the key element of attribution; while JCE is based primarily on the common
state of mind of the perpetrators (a subjective criterion), co-perpetration and
indirect perpetration also depend on whether the perpetrator exercises control
over the criminal act (an objective criterion).120 He suggested that these doctrines
should be harmonized in the jurisprudence of the ad hoc tribunals to better
reflect the notion of "commission" in different national legal systems.121
These attempts to introduce the doctrines of co-perpetration and indirect
perpetration into ICTY jurisprudence, however, failed to dethrone JCE as the
preferred mode of commission liability at the ad hoc tribunals.12 2 Part of the
reason for this is that, notwithstanding Gacumbitsi, the opinions lack any detailed
examination of the elements of these doctrines. While the physical elements that
must be present to constitute these modes of liability are relatively precise, the
mental elements are quite ambiguous. For instance, the Stakic Trial Chamber's
holding that the accused must be aware of the substantial likelihood that crimes
will occur is scarcely sufficient to establish responsibility for specific intent
crimes such as genocide. It is also unclear whether all the accused persons
charged as co-perpetrators should share the relevant mental state, or whether
only a specific accused's state of mind is in question.123 Moreover, the opinions
do not succeed in clarifying the distinct bases of and functions performed by the

21 (Schomburg, J, separate opinion).
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doctrines of co-perpetration and indirect perpetration. Thus, an international
criminal lawyer unacquainted with the doctrines' background in German
criminal law and in legal systems influenced by German criminal law would be
hard pressed to be able to distinguish between the two.
The Pre-Trial Chamber of the ICC has fared a little better in its explication
of these forms of responsibility. In Lubanga, the Pre-Trial Chamber noted the
different approaches--objective, subjective and "control"-to distinguish
between parties to a crime and opined that the doctrine of "control" over the
crime was expressly included in the provision of liability for indirect perpetration
in Article 25(3)(a) of the Rome Statute.12 4 It stated that the notion of "coperpetration" in the same Article must therefore cohere with this criterion for
differentiating between principals and accessories.125 Thus, only persons who
have control over the crime by virtue of the essential tasks assigned to them for
the commission of the crime and are aware of having such control can be
considered joint or co-perpetrators.1 26 Since the notion of "control" is at the
heart of the Lubanga Chamber's adoption of co-perpetration, it would have been
helpful for the Chamber to have expanded on what exactly control, especially
"joint control," encompasses. One could argue, for instance, that joint control
over the act presupposes equal participation or contribution by the coperpetrators, whereas different kinds or degrees of contributions would lead to
distinctions in the categorization of different parties to the crime.127
The Lubanga Chamber then specified the objective and subjective elements
of co-perpetration. The objective elements consist of, first, an agreement or a
common plan between two or more persons. This plan can be implicit and
should include an element of criminality, even though it need not be directed
specifically at the commission of a crime.128 The second required objective
element is coordinated essential contribution by each perpetrator resulting in the
realization of the objective elements of the crime. This contribution may be at
any stage of the crime.129
124
125
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contribution as activating mechanisms by leaders that lead to automatic compliance with their

182

Vol. 12 No. 1

The ControlTheof ofPerpetration

fain

The first subjective element is that the accused must fulfill all subjective
elements of the crime with which he is charged, including the specific intent for
crimes such as genocide. For most crimes under the jurisdiction of the ICC, this
would mean meeting the "intent" and "knowledge" requirements in Article 30(1)
of the Rome Statute.130 The second subjective element is that all co-perpetrators
must be mutually aware of and accept that the execution of the common plan
may result in the realization of the objective elements of the crime. If there is a
substantial likelihood that the objective elements of the crime would occur, this
mutual acceptance can be inferred from the co-perpetrators' awareness of this
likelihood and their decision to implement the plan despite such awareness. If,
on the other hand, the risk is low, the co-perpetrators must have expressly
accepted that implementing the plan would result in the realization of the
objective elements of the crime. 131 The third subjective factor is the accused's
awareness of the factual circumstances enabling him to jointly control the
crime-that is, that his role is essential in the implementation of the common
plan and that he can frustrate its realization by failing to perform his function.132
The sparseness of the elements outlined by Lubanga makes it difficult to
assess how they would be applied to concrete cases before the court. Moreover,
some of the interpretations in Lubanga give rise to further concern. For instance,
in the absence of any direct evidence that Lubanga was involved in the
recruitment of child soldiers, the Trial Chamber based his responsibility for this
crime on his "essential role" in the common plan between him and some leaders
of the Forces Patriotiquespour la Libiration du Congo (FPLC)'33 to broaden the base
of their army.134 The Chamber held that the implementation of this plan, which
targeted young recruits, entailed the objective risk that children under fifteen
years of age would be recruited.'13 Given Lubanga's key role in the overall
coordination of the FPLC, the Chamber held that he had joint control as a co-

130

orders, including designing an attack, supplying ammunition, and coordinating the activities of
troops).
Lubanga, Case No ICC-01/04-01/06, Confirmation of Charges at
349-60; Katanga and Chui,
Case No ICC-01/04-01/07, Confirmation of Charges at IN 527-32.

131 Labanga, Case No ICC-01/04-01/06, Confirmation of Charges at
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361-65; Katanga and Chui,
Case No ICC-01 /04-01/07, Confirmation of Charges at 1$ 533-37.
Lubanga, Case No ICC-01/04-01/06, Confirmation of Charges at
366-67; Katanga and Chui,
Case No ICC-01/04-01/07, Confirmation of Charges at
538-39.
The ForcesPaftiotiquespour la Lbiraiondu Congo was the military wing of a political group in Congo
called the Union of Congolese Patriots (UPC), of which Lubanga was the founder and leader.
Lubanga,Case No ICC-01/04-01/06, Confirmation of Charges at $$ 7-8.
See Lubanga, Case No ICC-01/04-01/06, Confirmation of Charges at
Id.
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perpetrator over the implementation of the plan.136 This part of the decision has
been criticized on the basis that Lubanga's key role in the leadership of the
FPLC and its activities does not support the inference that his contribution was
essential for the specific crime of the recruitment of child soldiers.137 The
criticism is certainly valid and stems from the Chamber's failure to clarify what it
deems as the object of essential contribution-that is, the specific crime or the
common plan.
Another instance of the potential divergence between the outlined element
and its application is in inferring mutual acceptance that the execution of the
plan may result in the realization of the objective elements of the crime in lowrisk cases from the co-perpetrators' express acceptance of this result.138 As an
example of this express acceptance, the Chamber points to when "killing is
committed with 'manifest indifference to the value of human life;"' on the other
hand, intent is absent when the actor perceives a non-substantial risk but
believes that his expertise will prevent the realization of the offense.'13 However,
it is difficult to see how "manifest indifference" in the first case can imply
"acceptance" of the victim's death, apart from treating this as an acceptance of
the risk of death (which in the Chamber's formulation is not sufficient to prove
intent in low-risk cases). In contrast, one could say in the second case that the
actor "accepts the risk" and is simply mistaken about his ability to prevent the
risk, the level of his expertise, or both.140
In the decision of confirmation of charges in Katanga and Chui, the PreTrial Chamber endorsed and expanded upon the notion of control and liability
under Article 25(3) (a) developed in Lubanga.141 In Katanga and Chui, however, the
Chamber focused on the elements of liability for joint perpetration through
another person. The Chamber saw no merit in the defense's argument that the
phrase "jointly with another or through another person" can include either "coperpetration" or "indirect perpetration," but not "indirect co-perpetration."14 2 It
then set out the objective elements for perpetration by means, concentrating on
the cases that it considered most relevant to international criminal law-where
the perpetrator in the background commits the crime through another, who is

136
137
138
139

See id at

383, 398.
See Weigend, 6 J Intl Crim Just at 486-87 (cited in note 12).
See Lubanga, Case No ICC-01/04-01/06, Confirmation of Charges at 1 354 n 436, quoting Stakic,
Case No IT-97-24-T, Trial Judgment at 587.
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140 See Weigend, 6 J Intl Crim Just at 483 (cited in note 12).
141 See Katanga and Chui, Case No ICC-01/04-01/07, Confirmation of Charges at T 480-86.
142 Id at 1 490-93.
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also criminally responsible, by means of "control over an organization"
(Organisaionsherrchaf).143
The first element consists of the perpetrator's control over the
organization.'" The Chamber opined that since Article 2 5(3)(a) expressly
provided for the commission of a crime through another culpable person, it
would also encompass cases involving the principal's control over an
organization.145 Several national jurisdictions employed this concept to hold
leaders of organizations responsible as perpetrators rather than accessories,146 on
the basis that in some cases of complex crimes, a person's degree of
blameworthiness increases in tandem with his rise in the hierarchy within an
organizational structure.147 The concept had also been recognized in the
jurisprudence of international tribunals.148
The second element is the existence of an organized and hierarchical
apparatus of power.149 The organization must be composed of superiors and a
sufficient number of subordinates who are fungible, hence ensuring manifest
compliance with orders. The leader must exercise authority through means such
as his power to hire, train, discipline, and provide resources to his subordinates.
This control should be mobilized to secure compliance with orders that include
the commission of crimes within the Court's jurisdiction.150
The third element is execution of the crimes through "automatic"
compliance with orders.'"' The organizational apparatus must be designed such
that subordinates are mere cogs in the wheel and are easily replaceable. Thus,
any single person's failure to follow orders cannot compromise the plan. In this
fashion, the organization develops a life of its own, which enables it to function
independently of the identity of any single executor. This automatic compliance,

143
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which is at the heart of the leader's liability as a principal, may also be achieved
through intensive and violent training regimens for subordinates.1 52
The Chamber went on to hold that a co-perpetrator could be held liable
for the crimes committed by the culpable subordinates of his co-perpetrator on
the basis of mutual attribution by combining the doctrines of
Organisaionsherschaft and co-perpetration. 153 It repeated the objective and
subjective elements required for co-perpetration in Lubanga and added an
additional subjective element in the case of co-perpetration of a crime through
another person-the accused's awareness of the factual circumstances enabling
him to exercise control over the crime through another person, that is, the
character of the organization, his position of authority within the organization,
and factual circumstances enabling automatic compliance with orders.154
The heavy reliance of the Katanga and Chui Pre-Trial Chamber on the
theory of Organisationsherrschaftis controversial, given that this theory does not
enjoy wide support in domestic legal systems, 55 with the exception of Germany
and a few Latin American states that are heavily influenced by German legal
doctrine. Indeed, the Chamber cites Claus Roxin almost exclusively in its
elucidation of the elements of the doctrine.56 Moreover, there is considerable
debate even in German academic circles about the viability of the doctrine.15 As
noted in Section II, the individual elements of the doctrine of
Organisationsherrschaft have been subjected to considerable criticism, and
prominent academics in Germany reject the application of the doctrine
altogether in favor of co-perpetration and even secondary responsibility for
instigation. The elements of Organisationsherrschaftoutlined by the Chamber also
represent an amalgam of different versions of the doctrine and do not strictly
map on to Roxin's version of it. For instance, there is no mention of the
criterion of detachedness from the law, which is central to Roxin's account of
Organisaionsherrschaft.The criterion of fungibility also loses much of its bite
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because automatic compliance with orders can be secured through violent
training methods as well.
These are important formal concerns that the ICC would need to address if
it continues to apply the doctrines of co-perpetration and indirect perpetration
(or Organisationsherschaf) to hold individuals responsible as perpetrators for
international crimes. None of them, however, touches on the more substantive
issue of whether these are theoretically sound modes of liability that the ICC can
legitimately adopt for international crimes. We now turn to examine some recent
voices of dissent recommending a cautionary approach to adopting coperpetration and Organisationsherrschaftat the international level and the reasons
they put forward for thus arguing.
B. Recent Challenges to the Control Theory of Perpetration
1. Ohlin's theory of joint intentions.
Perhaps the most detailed criticism to date (in English) of the control
theories of co-perpetration and indirect perpetration in international criminal law
is Jens David Ohlin's recent work on joint intentions. 118 Ohlin is concerned with
developing a theory that adequately explains the imposition of vicarious liability
on all participants of a criminal endeavor for the actions of their colleagues, and
he puts forward the concept of "joint intentions" as a doctrinally sound and
practically useful way of accounting for this.' He poses his doctrine of joint
intentions as a counter to the doctrine of co-perpetration based on the control
theory, on the ground that the latter does not pay serious attention to the mental
state of the perpetrators. 6 o Ohlin's paper is a rich and theoretically complex
analysis of the control theory and his suggested alternative, but it falters on at
least two counts: (1) his problematization of the control theory of perpetration
misunderstands its proper nature, and (2) his own theory of joint intentions
actually comes quite close to a true account of the control theory, but is still less
sophisticated than the control theory in some respects. I will elaborate on both
these arguments in turn.
The first concern with Ohlin's account of the control theory of
perpetration stems from a methodological anxiety. Ohlin outlines the elements
of the theory mainly as he understands them to have been set out by the ICC
and the ICTY."' This overwhelming reliance on scant pronouncements by these
158 Jens David Ohlin, joint Intentions to Commit InternationalCimes, 11 Chi J Intl L 693 (2011).
159
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160
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courts leads to overly broad statements about the doctrine and also confusion
about its limits as well as its promise. For instance, one of his criticisms against
the use of the concept of "co-perpetration" based on control is that it seems to
imply a model of cooperation among a small number of individuals, making it
unsuitable for international crimes that are committed by a large number of
people.162 This is, however, precisely the reason why commentators as well as
the ICC combine co-perpetration with Organisationsherrschaftto address situations
of mass criminality. Ohlin acknowledges this only partly when he states that it is
not clear whether the drafters of Article 25(3)(a) of the Rome Statute considered
this possibility, as the wording is simply "jointly with another."'16 Since there
was little debate on the inclusion of indirect perpetration in Article 25,' the
travaux preparatoirescannot be relied on for guidance. However, the sensible
interpretation would be that since the drafters could not have been unaware that
international crimes can be committed by a plurality of persons, it would be
unwise to have an artificial limit on the number of parties that may be involved
in the act of perpetration, and there is certainly nothing in the wording of Article
25(3)(a) that would militate against the participation of a plurality of
perpetrators.
Ohlin describes the mens rea requirements for indirect perpetration as a
person's "awareness of his or her control over the crime" and for co-perpetration
as a person's "awareness of their joint control over a common plan and
awareness of their essential contribution to it;" in addition, "co-perpetrators
must also have the intent that the physical perpetrators commit the crime." 6 1
Ohlin's quibble with this mental standard is the interpretation of what it means
to "intend" the crime-the ICC considers it fulfilled if the co-perpetrators are
aware that the physical perpetrators will commit the offense and either consent
or reconcile themselves to it.'66 Ohlin cites two problems with this standard: (1)
that this level of intent, known as dolus eventualis, is unknown to common law
systems and is a lower standard than the Rome Statute's definition of intent,
which requires awareness that a consequence will occur "in the ordinary course
of events"; and (2) this lower standard is particularly troubling since the ICC
does not interpret it to mean that the plan itself must have a criminal goal, but
only that the perpetrator must reconcile himself to the risk that its pursuit will
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entail the perpetration of crimes."' Neither objection is especially convincing. P,
who is aware of the risk that the acquisition of political control over the territory
of a nation (itself not criminal) will result in the commission of crimes-such as
unlawful killings, forced labor, and sexual and physical violence "'-and
reconciles himself to that risk, can justifiably be barred from claiming that he did
not intend these crimes. Similarly, the fact that a particular level of intent is not a
feature of common law systems is not a decisive argument against employing it
for international crimes. In the same vein, one could argue that the concept of
indirect perpetration despite a criminally responsible intermediary, which the
Rome Statute expressly recognizes, is unknown to the common law world.
International criminal law is replete with such instances of adaptation from
criminal law principles that enjoy far-from-universal application. This standard is
also not necessarily lower than what the Rome Statute would require; as
Weigend points out, if P knows that there is a substantial risk of bringing about
the elements of the offense and nevertheless acts such that the offense occurs,
he can legitimately be said to have willed the offense and that this is compatible
with his knowledge that the offense would occur in the ordinary course of
events.1

Ohlin then comes to the heart of his objections against the control theory
by revealing its inadequacy in providing a coherent account of a series of
hypothetical fact situations. The first is the "Love Parade" scenario where the
uncoordinated behavior of several hundred individuals who are caught in a
tunnel causes a stampede, resulting in the deaths of several people.o Ohlin
states that in this case it is difficult to determine whether there was a common
plan and whether the contribution of each individual is essential. He alleges that
the doctrine resorts to counterfactuals for judging "essentiality," which produces
a paradox-each individual's role can be considered non-essential, as the
stampede would have happened regardless of his individual role, but if one uses
this analysis for all the participants, then the stampede would not occur at all. 7 1
This is not an entirely accurate account of the test of "essentiality." Weigend,
whom Ohlin cites for his test of essentiality, goes on to say that the essentiality
of a contribution has to be judged from the viewpoint of the concrete plan; the
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mere fact that the crime could have been committed in a different manner than
the one planned does not make the contribution inessential, as long as the
participants worked jointly according to their agreed plan and the contribution
of each was essential to the plan. 7 2 Thus, in the Love Parade case, the
assessment of essentiality has to be made in the context of the concrete plan, if
one existed, between the participants in the stampede. As Ohlin acknowledges,
this concrete plan was absent, and the uncoordinated behavior of the
participants caused the stampede."'7 However, he seems to suggest that this
causes a problem for the control theory, which does not require a common
criminal plan but only the realization of a substantial risk of criminal
consequences. 7 4 This is a fairly misleading analysis. There are at least two things
missing in this scenario that would be required by the control theory. First, there
is no common plan that the participants realize will entail criminal consequences.
Second, Ohlin entirely omits any mention of the objective requirement of
working together on the basis of division of labor, which is also missing in the
case of a stampede. The same factors will need to be considered to determine
liability in the second hypothetical derived from the Essen Lynching case, 7 1
which would considerably reduce the element of elusiveness that worries
Ohlin.'76
Ohlin has different concerns in his concentration camp scenario. There he
questions whether the camp guards in charge of the inmates can be considered
jointly in control of the crimes in the camp, considering that they are in the
middle of the organizational hierarchy and the commandant of the camp
exercises ultimate control over them.'77 Ohlin mistakenly uses co-perpetration
analysis for this scenario,17 1 which would be more ideally dealt with under the
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doctrine of Organisationsherrschaft.The latter considers it irrelevant whether the
indirect perpetrator acts on his personal initiative or on the instructions of more
highly placed superiors. All that is required is that the indirect perpetrator can
direct or steer the part of the organization that is subordinate to him, without
having to rely on the resolution of his subordinates for the commission of the
offense.'79 Of course, this only applies if the other conditions for
Organisationsherrschaftliability, outlined earlier, are present.
The thrust of Ohlin's critique is that the control theory severely understates
the importance of the culpable mental state of the participants of collective
crimes in favor of the objective element.o This criticism is a recurrent theme
throughout his analysis of the control doctrine. He also states that
"intentionality-rather than control-must be the center of any doctrine of
group criminality"'"' and that the ICC's approach towards the control theory
results in such a low threshold of intentionality that the control requirement
appears to do all the "heavy lifting" in the doctrine.' This account is slightly
mystifying. It gives the impression that the control doctrine is entirely devoid of
any subjective requirements. As discussed in Section II, intentionality is as much
a part of the control doctrine as are the objective elements of working jointly on
the basis of functional role allocation and division of labor. The true subject of
Ohlin's disagreement with the control theory is not "intentionality versus
control," but rather the level of intent he considers appropriate for attribution of
criminal liability.
This mischaracterization of the elements of co-perpetration and indirect
perpetration leads Ohlin into his account of what he considers central for the
ascription of liability-the distinctive mental state of the participants in a
collective endeavor.' 83 Ohlin states that "[d]efendants should only be held liable
for each other's actions when each has the intention that they commit the crime
together."'" I agree, and so does the control theory, but the theory has a
different vision perhaps of what constitutes intent and also goes further than
Ohlin in requiring certain kinds of physical conduct.
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Ohlin relies on Michael Bratman's influential "Shared Intentions" thesis to
develop his account of joint intentions: X and Y both have individual reciprocal
intentions that they engage in an activity together; each individual desires that
the group commit the action with the knowledge that the other individual
desires the same; and each has an expectation that their activities will be
coordinated to achieve this desire.' As Ohlin notes, this account is highly
individualistic. It relies on the intentions of each individual person, and the
"collective element," insofar as it exists, is supplied by the concept of planning,
which yields a "shared intention."'
Ohlin develops his own variation on
Bratman's account by taking this element of planning to involve the process of
pooling information by the participants and collective decision-making, so as to
achieve the desired collective aim."s8 He then uses this analysis to assess whether
the theory of joint intentions yields a better account of the behavior and
responsibility of the participants than the control theory.'18 For instance, in the
Love Parade example, he applies joint intentions to conclude that since the
participants did not act in cooperation and did not make decisions in light of the
actions of the other participants in the tunnel, there would be no question of
vicarious liability."' Similarly, in the "Attack Against Civilians" scenario, where a
group of soldiers is directed to seize a town and decides to kill any civilians it
encounters in order to achieve this aim, Ohlin refers to the shared commitment
to the goal and the coordination, along with meshing of plans to achieve the
goal, which all together justify vicarious responsibility. The basis for
responsibility is that by intending for the group to commit the offense and also
intending to contribute to the collective plan, each soldier "makes the action his
own."' 90 This, however, is at least part of the inquiry that the control theory of
co-perpetration would also require.
As noted earlier, co-perpetration signifies the joint commission of a
criminal act by individuals knowingly and willingly working together towards its
accomplishment. It is based on the joint control of each individual stemming
from the division of labor and functional role allocation, which ensures that the
crime can be committed only through the cooperation of each co-perpetrator.
The two elements of the control theory of co-perpetration mirror the analysis
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Ohlin wants to undertake: (1) the co-perpetrators must work together jointly,
based on a division of labor towards the attainment of the result of the elements
of the offense; and (2) the co-perpetrators must reach a common agreement or
plan denoting mutual consent over the joint realization of the act, where each
individual acts in the awareness that there are other participants who are likewise
working towards a common plan. This agreement would exclude situations such
as a coincidental, simultaneous exploitation of a situation by persons working
side-by-side but in the absence of a joint accord.
Ohln would indeed be introducing a novel element into the current
literature on responsibility for collective endeavors were he to put forward a
reasoned basis for the proposition that his theory of joint intentions suggests,
but does not conclusively establish. This proposition is that each participant
must have the direct intent to commit the crime and that mere dolus eventualis
would not suffice. However, none of Ohlin's hypotheticals provide conclusive
support for such a proposition. He also takes pains to emphasize that he is not
sure what the theory of co-perpetration as control adds to his account of joint
intentions, or how it improves upon his account in any manner.191 The answer
actually lies in something Ohlin himself acknowledges: "joint intentions" is a
necessary, but not sufficient, account of perpetration liability for collective
Unlike the control theory of co-perpetration, it has nothing to say, or
crimes.
at least Ohlin does not articulate any statement, on the objective or actus reus
elements required for criminal liability.
2. Osiel's critique of Organisationsherrschaft.
While Ohlin claims to offer an alternative to the "control theory of
perpetration," as the above analysis explained, most of his comments pertain to
"co-perpetration" and do not affect significantly the doctrine of indirect
perpetration and its variant OTranisaionsherrschaft.This latter doctrine is the focus
of the discussion in Mark Osiel's writings that are concerned as much with the
law of superior responsibility as with the JCE doctrine.193 Osiel is on balance
positive about the promise of Organisationsherrschaftas a mode of perpetration
responsibility, and his writing does not completely reject its application to
international crimes. As he notes, one of the major insights of the doctrine of
Organisationsherrmchaftlies in its simultaneous recognition of how individuals who
are in control of organizational resources can harness these to perpetrate mass
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atrocity through willing and culpable subordinates, while avoiding liability for
mere organizational membership.19 4 Osiel's concern stems instead from
individual elements of Organisationsherrschaftand how well they are able to reflect
the reality of mass atrocity.
Osiel is skeptical about Roxin's adherence to a tightly structured and
hierarchical organizational apparatus that is harnessed by the military or civilian
superior to commit the crimes he intends. As Osiel demonstrates, such an
organizational form rarely constitutes the medium through which mass atrocity
is planned, incited, and perpetrated. Informal networks of power are often a
more potent force of killings and destruction than hierarchical organizations. 9 s
Not only can the de facto exercise of power deviate from its de jure conferment,
but no individual or even set of individuals completely exercises authority over
the conduct of individuals at the lower levels of the hierarchy, who often enjoy
considerable latitude and discretion in the exercise of their functions."' This
individual initiative may indeed deliberately be encouraged by superiors or may
even be wrested reluctantly from them."' Osiel also challenges the contingency
of the superior's control on the subordinate's fungibility. He correctly points out
that, especially in small organizations, members are not so readily replaceable,
and that even if they are, a superior may yet expect his instructions to be
followed for entirely different reasons, such as indifference on the part of the
subordinates.' It is for this reason that Katanga specifically recognizes other
forms of exercising control, such as "intensive, strict, and violent training
regimes," that enable automatic compliance with orders. "
These are strong objections that deserve serious consideration. Roxin's
organizational structure, though conceded by him to be an "ideal type," 200 does
not reflect the reality of the majority of situations of mass conflict. Crimes
committed by the direct perpetrators in these situations are often spontaneous
crimes, crimes of opportunity, or individual responses to a climate of
permissibility. The direct executor can hardly be said to be part of any power
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structure, and even less a tightly organized and controlled one, especially given
that the crimes are spatially and temporally widespread and can encompass
entire geographical regions. Perhaps Roxin would circumvent this objection by
limiting the requirement of a taut hierarchical structure with regular operational
sequences to the leadership level of the organization. Thus, top and maybe even
mid-level officials must be part of this vertical hierarchical structure that
unleashes the chain of events leading to the commission of mass crimes.
However, this would be contrary to his criterion of the fungible direct executor
aspart of the organizational chain structure.
Similarly, the criterion of fungibility is also not convincing, especially in the
context of mass atrocity. As discussed in Section II on German criminal law, this
element is widely criticized in German criminal law literature on the ground that
perfect substitutability of the subordinate is not likely in the context of the
concrete offense. Even if we take the criterion to imply the subordinate's belief in
his fungibility, rather than actual substitutability, this will not necessarily result in
his willingness to perform the criminal act.
Neither objection is, however, fatal to the attractiveness of the basic
concept of Organisaionsherrschaft.The doctrine has withstood the rejection of the
element of fungibility by domestic courts20 as well as the ICC,202 since control
leading to an expectation of compliance with instructions can be achieved
through other mechanisms. Similarly, as Osiel notes, Roxin's image of a
machine-like apparatus with a potentially infinite number of drones at its
disposal is simply a metaphor.203 The power of the metaphor must not, however,
succeed in distracting from the message it seeks to convey-that "control" may
be established by an indirect perpetrator through his ability to manipulate or
utilize an operational framework or apparatus that involves scores of culpable
individuals, whom he may indirectly harness to achieve the ends he desires. This
apparatus need not, however, be vertically structured or rigidly hierarchical;
informal networks of power with weak links may well prove more efficient for
1 indirect perpetrator's control
the commission of international crimes.2 04 The
over the apparatus may be established through different mechanisms. Quite
often, it will be based on occupying a position of authority that enables him to
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order his subordinates to commit the crimes he intends and to supply them with
the resources to do so.205 He may use this position to perform activities ranging
from formulating a criminal plan, deciding on the mode of its execution, setting
up a framework to achieve the intended outcome, and ordering subordinates to
ensure its implementation.
IV. THE PROMISE OF THE CONTROL THEORY
The previous discussion should make amply evident that my account of the
control theory of perpetration is far from evangelical; despite, or perhaps
because of, its recent championing by the international criminal law community,
I share the worry that an uncritical adoption of the control theory by
international criminal law would be a disastrous course of action to pursue.
Nevertheless, I hold that it is equally unhelpful to throw the baby out with the
bathwater; the control theory in its different variants can provide a promising
template around which one can construct a theory of perpetration for
international crimes. Emphasis on the concept of "control" and the perpetrator
as the central figure in the course of events constituting an offense
(Zentralgestall, based either on his functional control over the act (coperpetration) or his control over the will of the direct perpetrator (indirect
perpetration), opens up the possibility of holding several people simultaneously
responsible as principals. Differentiating between the principal and the accessory
based on the weight and quality of the party's contribution to the act is also an
appealing starting point for the construction of a concept of perpetration for
international crimes. If someone is a marginal figure in the occurrence of the
criminal act and his contribution to it is secondary in nature, such that he would
be considered as contributing to the act of another, he should be classified as an
accessory rather than a principal. This is certainly a more accurate
characterization of the role of an immediate physical perpetrator of a murder
that is part of a genocidal policy of which he is ignorant.
The individual forms of perpetration based on the control theory also
provide a useful starting point for thinking more clearly about a theory of
perpetration that corresponds to the reality of mass atrocity. This is particularly
true of the concept of indirect perpetration, which addresses several of our
intuitions about mass atrocity and which can be modified and developed into a
coherent account of principal responsibility. For instance, Schroeder premises
the indirect perpetrator's (Hintermann's) responsibility on the fact that he
deliberately inflames the dormant passions of the intermediary so as to use him
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as a tool to achieve the criminal result he desires. 206 This is certainly one part of
the reality of how high-level perpetrators can harness ordinary people to
physically commit the crimes that they have planned and set in motion. The
same emphasis on the carefully planned actions of the Hintermann that enable
him to manipulate circumstances such that he can ensure the fulfillment of the
elements of the offense he intends is apparent in the BGH's version of
Oganisationsherrschaft.The Hintermann's liability hinges on his conscious creation
and utilization of the basic framework conditions of an organizational structure
that result in the realization of an offense. 207 In both cases, the focus is, as Roxin
states (though not quite for the same argument), on the Hintermann's ability to
unleash destruction on a scale that simply cannot be equated with an ordinary
instigator. 208 Though the language of the law can scarcely accommodate an
element as vague as "destructive potential" in its lexicon, it is an important
insight to keep in mind while constructing a theory of perpetration.
The other important contribution of Organisationsherrschaftto a theory of
attribution of criminal responsibility lies in its differentiation of individual
unlawfulness from collective unlawfulness. Organisationsherrchaft provides a
foundation for a claim that principles of criminal responsibility and attribution
may differ for cases of individual and collective criminality.209 The Hintermann's
criminal responsibility in the latter case is derived from organizational
(collective) unlawfulness rather than the act of any single individual
perpetrator. 210 This obviates the problem of having to trace the chain of
causation from each physical perpetrator's individual act of murder or rape to
the overall genocidal enterprise in which the Hintermann occupies a leadership
position. It also circumvents the contradiction in holding the Hintermann liable
despite a criminally responsible intermediary. It offers the closest analogue in
domestic criminal law theories on perpetration to the uniquely collective
dimension of the elements of an international crime.
Perhaps even more significant than these elements is Roxin's criterion of
detachedness from the law, which has been curiously ignored in most of the
discussion on Otganisationsherrschaft.This criterion is to my mind one of the
major strengths of Roxin's theory when applied to international crimes,
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especially if one takes "law" here to mean some form of "natural law" rather
than the positive legal order. It is exactly because such unwritten higher laws
cannot be immediately comprehended by the act intermediary that they do not
present a barrier to him for executing the contravening illegal instruction of the
Hintermann. This lack of comprehension would result from the intermediary's
unawareness of the material unlawfulness of the instructions due to the
ideological glare that surrounds situations of mass atrocity; the direct executor of
the international crime often acts in a social climate of moral permissiveness for
the criminal act. Roxin's criterion of law detachedness would then perform two
very important functions in clarifying the basis for international criminal
responsibility. It would capture the social context in which mass crimes are
committed and the "banality of evil" documented by historians and sociologists
in these situations;211 at the same time, it would provide a moral compass for the
behavior expected of the act intermediary when surrounded by a climate that
sanctions horrific acts of brutality and would constitute a normative justification
for his criminal responsibility. This element admittedly goes beyond a simple
assessment of the responsibility of the individual defendant before the court and
involves the court in ascertaining the veracity of complicated historical, social,
and political facts. However, it is this element that makes international crimes
distinct from their domestic counterparts. Moreover, it is this perversion of
norms that lends the high-level perpetrator his destructive potential. It makes
the commission of the individual crimes by ordinary people far more likely than
in a situation where these acts are condemned by the moral and social climate
and the individual must overcome his scruples in acting against them.
V. CONCLUSION
At first glance, it seems scarcely possible that the entire edifice of
international criminal law could have been constructed in the absence of a
philosophical foundation for what it means to be responsible as a principal party
to an international crime. The crisis witnessed today, with competing
conceptions of perpetration responsibility that are borrowed from domestic legal
systems, but without serious thought to their application to crimes that are
distinct from the garden variety wrongs that a large proportion of domestic
criminal law encounters, is a natural consequence of this lack of doctrinal
sophistication. In some ways, this is a pervasive feature of international criminal
law, and the conceptual confusion surrounding modes of responsibility is
reflective of deeper issues, methodological as well as doctrinal, that international
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criminal lawyers have been remiss in addressing. Two such issues feature most
prominently in developing a viable theory of perpetration for international
crimes: (1) an inadequate assessment and comparison of domestic criminal law
principles, and (2) the lack of attention accorded to isolating features of
international crimes that would necessitate a reconceptualization of domestic
principles of criminal responsibility.
The first failing invites a little more sympathy. International and
comparative criminal law are fairly new areas of research. Unlike traditional
fields of public international law on the one hand, and pure domestic criminal
law on the other, international criminal law practitioners and academics are
rarely trained in the methods and doctrines of international criminal law as
"career" academics or practitioners. It is perhaps not so surprising then that they
transpose their own training and experience in domestic criminal law systems or
in pure public international law doctrine to issues they confront in international
criminal law. This problem is only compounded by the fact that even someone
who sincerely wants to understand and analyze the different theories, debates,
and controversies in diverse domestic criminal law systems will not find this an
easy challenge to undertake. The primary problem is one of language and
translation. For instance, it is difficult to find a single textbook that explains the
main principles of German criminal law in detail in English. 212 The second
omission is a little more surprising, given that the entire discipline of
international criminal law at least prima facie assumes that there is something
different about certain crimes that are labeled "international," which justifies
taking them out of the purview of the exclusive jurisdiction of national courts
and legitimizes their investigation and prosecution by the international
community.
In this Article, I have made a modest attempt to address the first lacuna by
clarifying the bases for the ascription of criminal responsibility in a highly
theorized and influential system of criminal law: the German legal system. Given
the rather precipitate ascendance of modes of responsibility derived from the
German system in the international criminal law circles, it is vital that scholars
and practitioners are able to engage in an informed debate on their utility for
international crimes. I also identify features of these doctrines that are not
readily reconcilable with the reality of mass atrocity, while simultaneously
signaling the potential for their adaptation to the unique features of international
crimes. These are only the tentative first steps in the ambitious task of

212

Bohlander's work, Bohlander, German CriminalLaw (cited in note 15), is an excellent introduction
to the basic principles of German criminal law in English, but is unfortunately not particularly
helpful if one wants to understand in depth and critique these principles. Admittedly, this is also
not the purpose of his project, which only purports to give an overview of the law and theory.

Summer 2011

199

ChicagoJournalof InternationalLaw

fashioning forms of principal responsibility for international crimes that are
conceptually sound and practically useful. This is the task that must engage the
attention of the international criminal lawyer-not in isolation, but in
conversation with other disciplines that seek to understand the processes that
lead to mass atrocity.
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